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Abs tra c t 
In this paper, available data from World Bank and Food and 
Agriculture Organisation sources are presented in a brief, summary 
discussion of the food situation in Ethiopia, Kenya ,-Somalia, Sudan, 
Tanzania and Uganda. Specifically, the six countries are shown to be 
significant net exporters of 'food and beverages' . Subjects discussed 
in the paper include: food production, food imports, food aid, food 
exports, land use, rural demographic issues, and aggregate investment 
patterns. The intent is to highlight various aspects of the food 
crisis in the Horn of Africa and to initiate a policy discussion on 
various means that could be used to address the contemporary food 
situation. 
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The Food Situation in the Horn of Africa 
1. Executive Summary 
1. Sub-Saharan Africa is seen to have an escalating 'food deficit' 
problem, yet it remains a net exporter of food. When exotic foods, such as 
coffee, cocoa and tea, and industrial crops, such as cotton, sisal and 
pyrethrum, are added, sub-Saharan Africa appears as a significant net ex-
porter of agricultural commodities. This general situation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa also holds for the six countries in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. 
2. Currently, three of the countries in-the Horn of Africa 
— Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan — are listed as having "severe food shortages" 
while Tanzania and Somalia are seen to have "inadequate food suppliesi" 
Only Uganda is able to address its immediate food needs. 
3. A growing food deficit reflects both declining food produc-
tion per capita and a shift in taste preference, by an emerging elite, away 
from local staples to wheat and rice. Such a shift in taste preference is 
a function of increasing per capita income, and is fostered with food aid. 
Wheat and rice are not grown in adequate quantities, so the effect of the 
taste transfer is increasing food imports. Where genuine food shortages 
exist, the preferred approach to meeting such shortages would be increased 
supplies of local staples. 
4. The six countries in the Horn of Africa are experiencing 
rapid population growth. The cause of the population growth is a declining 
death rate, primarily lower infant and child mortality rates, without a 
corresponding decline in the crude birth rate.. The population increase is 
not seen as the primary cause of a growing 'food deficit' situation, but 
the extent and nature of the population growth does increase significantly 
the cost of achieving development. , .. 
5. A variable which needs to be addressed is the continuing 
high birth rate. For the majority of the people, operating as small-scale 
peasant farmers, frequently at subsistence levels, there is little or no 
incentive to reduce family size. For such peasant families, children 
still represent the primary means of social security, the opportunity cost 
of the children remains quite low, and the opportunity cost to women of 
child-rearing also is low. 
IDS/WP 420 
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6. The Horn of Africa is not well endowed with arable land. 
The supply of arable land has increased some during the past two decades. 
With the exception of Uganda, the countries have increased the proportion 
of arable land devoted to expert crops. The combination of increased 
export cropping and food production being forced on to marginal land has 
reduced the proportion of arable land devoted to cereal crops in three 
of the six countries. With less land devoted to food production and with 
land productivity increases occurring at rates below the rates of increase 
of population, declining food production per capita was inevitable. 
7. The six countries in the Horn of Africa are predominantly 
rural. As a result, continued high rates of labour force growth mean the 
absolute size of the respective rural labour forces are growing as well. 
Historically, in developed countries, rapid increases in agricultural 
productivity were associated with a declining rural labour force. In the 
Horn of Africa, agricultural labour productivity increases will be more 
difficult to achieve as the rural areas, in the short term at least, will 
be required to absorb a growing number of people. 
8. The countries in the Horn of Africa all have dual economies. 
Labour productivity in non-agricultural activity continues to exceed 
labour productivity in agriculture by a multiple of five or more. Actively 
pursuing a unimodal approach to agricultural development is seen as one 
means of striving toward greater integration of agricultural and non-
agricultural activities. 
9. Given the relative poverty of the six countries, the propor-
tion of GDP devoted to investment remains well below that of the countries 
which have achieved some degree of development. The exception is Kenya, 
which has attracted significant quantities of foreign investment. In all 
six countries, the governments consider expenditures on the military as 
important or more important than investment in agriculture. 
10. Severe foreign exchange constraints necessitate extensive 
agricultural exports from the Horn of Africa. At the macro-level, such 
exports can be justified, both on grounds of comparative advantage and 
economic development. At the micro-level, the international exchange of 
'food' places a sizable number of-people, with a limited economic fran-
chise , at increased risk. 
- 3 -
IDS/WP 420 
2. Some Issues for Policy Debate 
2.1 General Policy Issues 
1. In a dual economy, peasant-based agriculture is a relative 
inexpensive means of 'holding' the reserve army of potential employees. 
Peasants supply food for themselves and they can be induced to supply 
labour to the formal sector as required. Where peasants are viewed 
primarily in such 'holding' terms, the ability of small-holder agriculture 
to contribute in the form of growing supplies of food, a growing market 
for formal sector output, and a significant source of savings will be 
severely constrained. Policies vis-a-vis peasants need to be reviewed, 
with the intent of enabling small-holder agriculture to make a more 
complete contribution to the development process. 
2. An additional effect of viewing peasants as merely a means 
of 'holding' the reserve army of potential employees is that peasants 
have little or no incentive to reduce family size. The provision of 
family planning services will have the desired effect once peasants want 
to reduce family size. The motivation affecting desired family size is 
an element which needs to be incorporated into development programs for 
peasant households. 
3. Women are the primary producers of food, they have almost 
total control over nutrition decisions, and they are significant contri-
butors to decisions on desired family size. Therefore programs designed 
to improve the nutritional status of the people, both in the short term 
and in the long run, need to be centred on women. A means to this end is 
to incorporate women into the planning, implementation and evaluation of 
each agricultural development program. 
4. The most vulnerable groups within a system of an international 
exchange of 'food' are the landless, farm labourers, the unemployed and 
the marginally employed. To address their food needs, food security should 
be focused on the local staples consumed by these low-income groups. Their 
needs can be addressed by limiting food subsidies to the low-income staples 
only. Similarly, increasing the producer price of such staples, relative 
to the price of other farm outputs, will increase the supply of low-income 
staple foods. Re-directing research resources and extension services 
toward such staples can serve to increase the yield per hectare in the 
production of these staple food crops. 
IDS/WP 420 
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2.2 Government Policy Issues 
5. One option available to agricultural exporting countries is 
to rely on the ready availability of food aid as a means of conserving 
foreign exchange. Such a policy carries with it specific political implic-
ations: 1) the availability of food aid declines as the stock of excess 
supplies of food decline, so food aid is least available when needed most; 
2) dependence on external sources of food reduces the control of govern-
ment over the local food situation; 3) to maximise their political lever-
age, donor countries prefer to wait until malnutrition is openly visible 
before entertaining the possibility of providing food aid; and 4) the 
receiving country must accept what is offered, which need not meet local 
taste preferences nor be the preferred form of nutrition. 
6. Foreign aid donors and international lending agencies are 
exerting considerable pressure to increase farm output prices. Their 
concern is not food security, but rather to limit the erosion of the 
foreign exchange situation, i.e., to protect the abilities of the 
countries in the Horn of Africa to service their international debt and 
to maintain their ability to import goods. The underlying premise of 
this advice is the behaviour of commercial farmers, the only farmers 
known to developed country advisors. For peasant farmers, price security 
is of prime importance. Price security includes: a clear indication of 
what price will be paid, a definite commitment that the announced price 
will be paid in full at delivery, and an assurance that market delivery 
of farm output will be possible. Should the government desire to affect 
planting as well as marketing decisions, the relative prices of the 
various farm outputs need to be announced before planting decisions are 
made. 
7. Selective judgement needs to be exercised in any attempts 
to expand agricultural exports. The average yield for an export crop, 
at current world prices, may well command more food on the international 
market than can be produced on the land used for the export crop. But, 
if increased production serves to depress world prices of all exports of 
that crop, such additional export crop output is not likely to command 
more food on the international market than can be grown locally on the same 
land. Increased use of agricultural land for export crops should be 
limited to those crops where the international demand is sufficiently 
strong (or distinctly elastic) to absorb increased supplies at prices 
similar to existing prices. 
b - IDS/WP 420 
8. For those crops where international commodity agreements 
exercise effective world supply management, attention should be focused 
on improved quality (and/or increased processing) of the commodity. 
9. Lack of water is the primary reason why so much of the land 
in the Horn of Africa is not considered arable at this time. Therefore, 
minimising the water embodied in agricultural exports is an appropriate 
selection criteria. Where other national or international organisations 
are pressing for increases in agricultural exports, their being required 
to finance the development of irrigation, to bring new land into produc-
tion, could be a condition for agreeing to such exports. 
10. To enable the formal sector to develop the capacity to 
provide needed agricultural inputs and to process the farm output ( a 
central element in a unimodal agricultural development strategy), a land 
tenure system is needed which facilitates the ability of peasant farmers 
to develop their land and effectively constraints the establishment of 
either large state or private farms that rely on imported inputs, subs-
titute scarce capital for abundant labour, and produce primarily for 
export. 
11. Given the limited economic franchise of a sizable portion 
of the population, the world market price of an export crop does not 
reflect the true opportunity cost of exports to the exporting country. 
This fact could serve as a basis for negotiating better export crop 
prices within international commodity agreements or new international 
economic order forums. Such a bargaining position would require coordination 
among the major exporters of a particular commodity. It is a bargaining 
position which would not be applicable if both low income countries and 
developed countries are exporting the same commodity, e.g., the competi-
tion between Somalia and Australia for the export of live animals to 
Saudia Arabia. 
12. The Horn of Africa is strategic to the territorial interests 
of the major world powers. As a result, the countries in the Horn of Africa 
have been drawn into the conflicts between these major powers. Because 
of their involvement in this larger international conflict, military ex-
penditures within certain countries in the Horn of Africa have escalated. 
The opportunity cost of such military expenditures, and their concomitant 
military action, has been reduced food security. Disengagement from super-
power -territorial struggles, plus renewed political activity to overcome 
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internal conflict, can be seen as major steps toward improved food 
security. 
2.3 Policy Issues for Non-Governmental Organisations 
13. There is a real need for coordination among non-govern-
mental organisations (NGO's) involved in development in the Horn of Africa. 
Currently, NGO's have a limited understanding of what constitutes develop-
ment, beyond the immediate success of their individual projects. Also, 
there is very little exchange of ideas and replication of successful prog-
rams among NGO's; each NGO insists on the right to repeat the errors and 
failures of the other NGO's. 
14. Given their relatively small size, their first-hand know-
ledge of the local situation, and their relative independence from govern-
ments, NGO's have the opportunity to be innovative. This role of local 
innovator should be pursued more actively by NGO's, especially with 
reference to food security issues. The impact on government policy and 
the extent of program replication would be indicators of successful innov-
ation. 
15. To engage in development with peasant farmers considerable 
time and effort needs to be invested to understand their mode of operation. 
African peasants are now recognised as having developed fairly complex 
farming systems. They have also been shown to be responsive to price 
changes, subject to their primary concern, the desire to minimise the 
risk involved in ventures related to their immediate livelihood. A general 
approach to peasant development is to address their most immediate concerns 
first — likely secure food sources, easier access to water, etc. — and 
then let each peasant household decide in what direction it wants to go to 
diversify its sources of additional income. 
16. Increased farm output will be a primary goal for peasant 
farm development programs. A complementary goal would be improved on-farm 
grain storage. The availability of on-farm storage will reduce the 
significant loses of food to rodents and insects and will reduce the 
dependency of farmers on traders and/or government institutions as the means 
of storage between harvests. Experimentation will be required, to deter-
mine the means of storage that are both effective and within the abilities 
of the local people to construct, use and maintain. 
IDS/WP 420 
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17. To increase the food security for the most vulnerable groups, 
we have noted in 4 above the need to improve the production of the staple 
crops consumed by the low-income groups in society. NGO's can set a 
pattern here, demonstrating ways of improved production and processing of 
that set of staple foods which serve to provide the best nutrition per 
unit of land and labour inputs. 
18. An additional way to address the overall food situation 
is experimenting with means of small-holder production of those foods 
currently imported. If successful, this would provide farm income from 
a source with a growing local market, would reduce the country's overall 
foreign exchange needs, and would make the peasant farmers less vulnerable 
than with export crops, as the farm output could be consumed whenever farm 
income deteriorates because of lower prices or partial crop failure. 
19. Water is an important constraint in the Horn of Africa. 
Cultivation methods, crop types and farming practices that conserve water 
would address this problem. Here is another area where NGO's could work at 
being local innovators. 
20. NGO's have some ability to command food aid. They also 
have a reputation of being able to deliver food faster, directly to those in 
need, than can the major international donors. Despite this ability and 
reputation, questions need to be raised in each situation whether bringing 
in external sources of food is the preferred way to address that expression 
of malnutrition. The primary case for external food aid is a tenporary 
increase in food supply designed to counter either speculation-based 
inflation in food prices or the disruptive effects of food hoarding. In 
other situations, the purchase and transfer of food within the country 
would be the preferred approach to counter temporary, location-specific 
food shortages. In pastoral areas, local droughts tend to depress the 
price of livestock and increase other food prices, reducing the ability 
of the local people to address their food needs. Transferring food in 
from other localities, and exchanging it for livestock at pre-drought prices, 
is one way of addressing this situation. 
3. The International Exchange of 'Food' 
According to North American media, sub-Saharan Africa has a 
growing "food deficit" problem. One quarter of the population is seen 
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to be hungry; twenty per cent of the grain needs are met by imports; some 
3 billion dollars are being transferred annually to the richest countries 
of the world in payment for food (Frankel, 1984: A30). 
It is a North American perception that it is American food 
production which provides the ultimate means of survival in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has estimated African food 
imports will need to increase by a multiple of two or three times during 
the 1980's merely to close the gap between food production and population 
size (North-South Institute, 1983: 2). A failure to rely on food aid and 
food imports will result in periodic, regional famines. 
This North Amrrican perception is based on an analysis of a sub-
set of agricultural production, primarily cereal grains. When total agri-
cultural production is considered, there are only a limited number of 
African countries in a deficit international trade position. Indeed, for 
sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, excluding food aid, food exports exceed 
food imports (World Food Council, 1983: 6). 
The observed food deficit arises because signficant amounts of 
agricultural production in Africa are exported, primarily to developed 
countries. These exports include such semi-exotic foods as coffee, cocoa, 
tea, bananas, groundnuts, and sugar and such industrial crops as cotton, 
sisal, rubber, palm oil and pyrethrum. Therefore, sub-Saharan Africa's 
growing "food deficit" can also be seen as a growing international exchange 
of semi-exotic food and industrial crops for North American grain. 
In an attempt to make this international exchange more specific, 
we have drawn together a set of relevant data for the six countries in 
the area of the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania 
and Uganda. A primary focus is the food situation. To place the food 
situation in perspective, we also discuss briefly demographic, production 
and trade variables. As data are drawn from international sources, all 
information is given as national totals only. With these data one cannot 
analyse regional differences within any one country. 
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4. The Growing Food Problem 
The nature of the food crisis in Africa has been documented 
extensively. The calories of food available per capita in 1980 was 
estimated to be ten per cent less than it had been ten years earlier 
(Crawley, 1980: 27). As of 1975, in 30 of the 50 countries in Africa, 
at least 15 per cent of the population was malnourished (Scrimshaw and 
Taylor, 1980: 28). In 27 of the countries there have occurred one or more 
famines in the 1950 to 1979 period (Kidron and Segal, 1981: Map 44). In 
19 countries the rate of growth of population now exceeds the rate of 
growth of food production (Frankel, 1984: A31). Currently five countries 
face "severe food shortages" while an additional 14 have "inadequate food 
supplies" (Rogal, et. al., 1984: 23). Of the six countries of immediate 
interest, Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya arelisted in the first group while 
Tanzania and Somalia are in the second group. 
The growing dependence on imported cereal grains in sub-Saharan 
Africa is evident in the increase in imports of cereal grains from 7.7 kgs. 
per capita in 1961-63 to 32.7 kgs. per capita in 1980-82 (Cleaver, 1984: 
Table 9). In part, this reflects the rapid increase in per capita income 
for a sub-set of the population in these countries. Diet patterns change 
as income increases. At low levels, approximately $250 to $300 per 
capita, calorie intake is drawn primarily from the local staples. From 
that level of income up to approximately $750 per capita there is a 
noticable shift in preference away from local staples to wheat and rice. 
Beyond that income level, a more varied diet is sought through an increased 
use of fats, sugars, fruits, vegetables and animal products.* 
The process of change in preferences toward wheat (and to a 
lesser extent maize) is encouraged through food aid. For sub-Saharan 
Africa, food aid in the form of cereal grains has increased from 2.7 kgs. 
per capita in 1975-77 to 6.4 kgs. per capita in 1981-83 (Cleaver, 1984: 
Table 10). 
These ranges are very rough approximations and would vary some from 
country to.country, depending in part on the relative prices of these 
"types of foods. The income ranges are given in 1980 U.S. dollars. 
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The food situation in the six countries under study is 
presented in Table 1, As a point of reference, wheredpossible, the 
weighted average for low income countries (excluding China and India) 
and the weighted average for middle income countries are provided as 
well 
As indicated in Table 1, for low income countries food avail-
ability, measured in terms of calories, was improving gradually from 
1960 to 1977, and then deteriorated somewhat. Middle income countries, 
in contrast, started with a higher level of food availability and were 
able to sustain the trend of improved food availability through 1981. 
In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya show a deteriorating situation 
throughout, stabilising well below daily requirements from 1977 to 1981. 
Tanzania and Uganda showed improved food availability through the 1960's and 
a deteriorating situation from 1970 onwards. Somalia shows the exact 
opposite. Only in Sudan has there been continued improvement in food 
availability over the two decade period. 
Food availability measured in grams of protein per day show 
trends very similar to that of calorie (item 2 in Table 1). Among the 
six countries there is considerable variation in the amount of protein 
available per capita, but all exceed the 1971 FA0 recommended minimum of 
40 grams per day (Poleman, 1981: 12). 
Food availability is deteriorating because food production per 
capita is declining (item 3, Table 1). The one exception was Sudan, which 
shows a higher level of per capita food production in 1977-79 than in 
1969-71, Even there, a significant deterioration has set in after 1977-79. 
All countries have experienced at least a ten per cent decline in food 
production per capita during the 1970's. In contrast, low income countries 
have experienced only a three per cent decline while middle income 
countries have increased food production per capita by eleven per cent 
during the decade,*{t 
* For 1982, low income countries were the 34 countries with a per capita 
Gross National Product (GNP) less than $425, Middle income countries were 
the 60 .countries with a GNP greater than $425 but less than $7000. In 
1982 five of the countries were low inccme; the exception was Sudan, which 
was ranked as the lowest of the middle income countries (World Bank, 1984: 
Table 1). 
s'csV This does not necessarily mean food production has declined. All six 
countries experienced rapid population growth during the decade (see item 
2, in Table 2). 
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Table 1. Food Consumption, Food Production, Food Imports and Food Aid in the Horn 
of Africa. 
Daily Calorie Supply 1758 
Per Capita: 1981 »s 
As.'.'a" Bercentage of -
Ethiopia Kenya Somalia Sudan Tanzania Uganda Low Income Middle 
Countries"1" Income 
Count-
ries 
2056 2119 2406 1985 1778 2082 2607 
Requirement: 1960 91 99 89 83 90 97 87 100 
19 70 87 95 82 91 91 98 90 101 
1977 75 88 88 93 89 91 96 109 
1981 76 88 100 99 83 80 91 111 
Protein (grams/day) 
1960 72 68 76 65 46 51 52 60 
1970 69 65 68 66 49 55 52 60 
1977 61 61 65 68 48 59 
1980 59 56 78 69 46 50 57 65 
Average Index of 
Food Production 
(1969-71=100) 
1977-79 84 92 85 105 94 90 97 107 
1980-82 82 88 60 87 88 86 97 111 
4. Cereal Imports 
(000's metric tons) 
1974 
1982 
118 
273 
15 
194 
42 
406 
125 
611 
431 
360 
37 
68 
8337 
6493 
41418 
66303 
5. Food Aid in Cereals 
(000's metric tons) 
1974/75 59 
1981/82 178 
6. Projected Cereal Short-
fall 1984/85 
2 
115 
(000's metric tons) 
- Marketing year June/Dec July/ 
June 
900* 900 
100* 475 
800* 425 
110 
175 
50 
185 
148 
254 
Jan. / / 
Dec. 
220 
70 
150** 
Jniy/ 
June 
850 
200 
6 50 
.July/ 
June 
430 
174 
256 
16 
49 
4029 
3391 
2390 
446 3 
- Total Shortfall 
- Estimated Imports 
-^ .Food Aid Required 
+ Low income countries excluding China and India. 
* Reflects estimated logistic capacity rather than actual cereal requirements, 
'cs'c Primarily reflects food aid required for the refugee population. 
Sources: Item 1 - 1960 and 1970, World Bank, 1983, Vol.2: Social Data Sheets .1 and 2; 
1977, World Bank, 1981: Table 22; 1981, World Bank, 1984: Table 24. Item 2 - World Bank, 
1983, Vol.2: Social Data Sheets 1 and 2. Item 3 - 1977-79, World Bank, 1981: Table 1; 
1980-82, World Bank, 1984: Table 6. Items 4 and 5 - World Bank, 1984: Table 6. Item 6 -
Food and Agriculture Organization, 1984: 5. 
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The deterioration of food availability need not correlate 
directly with the deterioration in per capita food production as the 
countries had different capacities (or willingness) to import cereal 
grains (item 4, Table 1). Five of the six countries were receiving large 
quantities of food aid in the 19 81/82 crop year. The favourable effect 
of food imports and food aid is especially evident in Somalia and, to a 
lesser extent, in Sudan. Of interest, in 1981/82 the middle income 
countries received more food aid than the low income countries excluding 
China and India. 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) projections for 
the coming crop year show a growing dependence on food aid (item 6, 
Table 1). Kenya, because of the drought, is seen to have an especially 
large shortfall through June of this >car, Ethiopia, again because of 
the drought, has a projected shortfall in 19 85 in excess of its logis-
tical capacity to import and distribute food. In Sudan there is a sharp 
increase, relative to 1981/82, in the need for food aid. The reason 
given is the drought in the northern part of the country (Food and Agri-
culture, 1984: 4), A comparison of projected 1984 cereal grain production 
with actual production in 1982 shows a drop of 600,000 metric tons of 
coarse grains (Food and Agriculture, 19 84: 25). Also, Table 1 shows a 
large decline in Sudan's ability to import cereal grains between 1981/82 
and 1984/85.* Tanzania's requirements remain high, but have stabilised. 
Somalia's projected food aid needs are for its sizable refugee population. 
Only Uganda is shown as able to produce enough for its overall food 
needs. 
As an international organisation, the FAO focuses primarily on 
natural causes, e.g., drought, as the explanation for the food shortfall. 
Another factor which is clearly present is both internal and international 
conflict. Such conflict generates refugees, affects the capacity to 
import food, reduces the ability to farm land under dispute and eliminates 
both the willingness and ability to address environmental issues. The 
effect of conflict is especially evident in Ethiopia and, to a lesser 
extent, in-".Somalia. Increasing hostilities in Sudan will cause the extent 
of the food shortfall there to escalate. Even in Uganda, the on-going 
civil strife is generating internal refugees who will require external 
intervention, if not external food. 
* This decline in capacity to import cereal grains could reflect a combin-
ation of a variety of factors: less cotton produced, lower cotton prices, 
pressing import needs in other parts of the economy, increasing cost of 
imports, or a change in government priorities. We do not have access to 
information on Sudan to be able to identify which of these factors are 
inyolved. 
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Also, it should be kept in mind that FAO projected food'needs 
represent an attempt to match excess production of cereal grains, 
primarily in North America, with foreseen food deficits. The FAO 
projections are an indicator that a food problem exists. In part, such 
a projected deficit reflects a shift in taste preferences, away from 
local staples to wheat and rice, among the emerging elite. The portion of 
the projections actually reflecting a food shortage, require increased 
supplies of whatever are the-local staples of the people involved. In 
some cases these could be purchased in other parts of the same country. 
Also, they lixely could be imported at costs below those of purchased 
cereal grains, but not at prices less than cereal grains in the form of 
food aid . 
5. Demographic Variables Related to the Food Situation 
One major thesis on Africa's food situation focuses on popul-
ation growth (Eicher, 1982: 151). Given the failure of food production 
increases to keep pace with population growth, and given widespread 
poverty, many go hungry; malnutrition is prevalent. 
In the previous section we already noted the decline in food 
production per capita in all six countries during the 1970's. Here we 
examine the denominator in that ratio: population growth. 
A comparison of the low income country and middle income 
country rates of growth of population (item 2 in Table 2), indicates 
the low income countries were following the middle income countries by 
one decade. The exception is the projected rate for 1980 to 2000; the 
rate of growth declines in middle income countries, but it continues to 
increase for the low income countries . The primary reason for this 
difference is the much larger decline in the crude birth rate for the 
middle income countries than for the low income countries (item 3, Table 
2). 
In the Horn of Africa, as is shown in Table 2, the increased 
population growth reflects primarily the rather dramatic decreases in 
the infant mortality and child death rates , Crude birth rates have 
remained fairly static during the period 1960 to 1982. 
Of the six countries, only Somalia has a population growth 
rate pattern similar to that of middle income countries. The reason 
-•ltt - IDS/WP 420 
for the lower growth rates is the smaller decline in the crude death rate 
than for the other five countries. Both the infant mortality rate and 
the child death rate were higher and have remained higher in Somalia. 
Sudan's rate of population growth peaked in the 1970's but at a rate some-
what higher than the average for low income countries. Therefore, the 
projected rate for 19 80-2000 remains at a level equal to the average for 
low income countries. Sudan has experienced a slight decline in the crude 
birth rate and only a moderate decline in the crude death rate. ,The infant 
mortality rate has remained relatively high. 
In both Ethiopia and Uganda there was a decline in the rate of 
population growth during the 1970's. For Ethiopia this could signal a 
downward trend as the birth rate has started to drop, but the level of the 
crude birth rate is still too high, relative to the crude death rate, to 
signal a significant reduction in the rate of growth of population. In 
Uganda it may well reflect the turmoil during the period of the Amin 
administration. Where the infant mortality and child death rates were 
below average in 1960, they are both above average for low income countries 
in 1982. 
» 
In Kenya and Tanzania the rate of population growth increased 
throughout the period. In Kenya, the combination of an unusually high 
crude birth rate and a very low crude death rate is causing the population 
to double approximately every 16 years. Both countries have a commendable 
record with reference to reduced infant mortality and child death rates. 
It is the static crude birth rate which is causing the problem. 
Declining birth rates are generally associated with a reduced 
need to rely on one's children for social security, an increase in the 
opportunity cost of children (they contribute less production and cost more 
to educate, etc.), and an increase in the opportunity cost of time for 
women. The latter is related to education for women and employment 
opportunities for women. Also, there is a positive correlation among 
countries between the decline in the birth rate and the degree of equality 
of distribution of income and wealth in a country. Kenya and Mexico serve 
to illustrate this at one extreme. 
The high rates of population growth clearly cause an increase 
in the cost of achieving development. First, the rate of growth in food 
production must be higher to feed the population. Second, the rate of 
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Table 2. Population Growth in the Horn of Africa 
Ethiopia Kenya Somalia Sudan Tanzania Uganda Low Income Middle : 
Countries+ Countr: 
1. Population (Mill.) 
1982 32.9 18 .1 4.5 20.2 19 . 8 13.5 
-projected 1990 19 26 5 25 26 17 
-projected 2000 24 40 7 34 36 25 
2. Population Growth 
(average annual %) 
1950-60 2 .1 2.5 1.8 2.0 2. 2 2.8 1.8 2.5 
1960-70 2.4 3.2 2.8 2.2 2. 7 3.0 2.5 2.6 
1970-82 2 .0 4 .0 2.8 3.2 3. 4 2.7 2.6 2.4 
-projected 1980-2000 3.1 4.4 2.4 2.9 3. 5 3.4 2.9 2.2 
3. Crude Birth Rate 
(per thousand) 
1960 51 55 48 47 47 49 47 43 
1982 47 55 48 45 47 50 44 35 
4. Crude Death Rate 
(per thousand) 
1960 28 24 29 25 22 21 24 17 
19 82 18 12 25 18 15 19 16 10 
5. Infant Mortality Rate 
(0-1 year; per 1000) 
1960 172 112 213 168 144 139 163 126 
1982 122 77 184 119 98 120 114 . 76 
6 . Child Death Rate 
(1-4 year; per 1000) 
1960 42 21 61 40 31 28 31 23 
19 82 25 13 47 23 18 22 19 10 
7 . Dependency Ratio (%) 
1960 87 101 87 88 84 86 
19 80 93 117 88 91 99 102 
2000 95 120 87 93 100 104 
+ Low income countries excluding China and India. 
Sources: Item 1 - World Bank, 1984: Table 19. Item 2 - 1950-60, World Bank, 1983 
Vol. 1: Table 1; 1960-2000, World Bank, 1984: Table 19. I tens 3 and 4 -
World Bank, 1984: Table 20. Items 5 and 6 - World Bank, 1984: Table 23. 
Item 7 - World Bank, 1984: 194. 
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growth of GNP has to be higher to maintain or increase the material 
standard of living. Third, with a rapid decline in infant mortality, the 
dependency ratio (the ratio of dependents to those persons economically 
active) increases.* After a lag of some 15 to 20 years the dependency 
ratio begins to decline but there occurs both a rapid increase in the growth 
of the labour force and the number of women entering child bearing age. 
Fourth, the proportion of resources that a society must devote merely to 
educate this large population-of children reduces the ability to engage 
in other forms of investment. 
Where we have recognised the cost inherent in rapid population 
growth, it does not necessarily follow that the population growth is the 
cause of relatively low rates both of -- economic growth and the growth in 
food production. For Africa as a whole, there is not a land constraint. 
According to Eicher (1982: 153): "... more than half of the arable land 
that is idle in the world is in Africa." In the short term, with a 
relatively static technology, population pressure is forcing people on to 
marginal land (Johnston, 1980: 71-72; 75-76), or on to land infested w ith 
tsetse flies (Eicher, 1982: 153), This affects agricultural productivity 
adversely, aggravating the current food crisis, but population pressure 
cannot be seen as a primary cause of an ongoing food problem. Historically, 
the decline in the rate of population growth has followed, rather than 
preceded, economic development, 
6 . Land Use Patterns 
The primary determinants of food production are land, labour and 
the capital and technology used to enhance their productivity. We consider 
first the patterns of land use evident in the six countries. Land use 
includes the amount of arable land available, the types of crops grown on 
the available land, and the yields obtained from the land. The available 
data on this subject are provided in Table 3. 
Arable land is defined as "land under temporary cultivation 
(double-cropped areas are counted only once), temporary meadows for 
mowing or pasture, land under market and kitchen gardens (including culti-
vation under grass), and land temporarily fallow or lying idle." (Food 
To place the dependency ratios reported in Table 2 in perspective, in 
1980 the dependency ratio in the United States was 51 while in Canada 
it was 46 (World Bank, 1984: 195). 
- 17 - IDS/WP 420 
and Agriculture Organisation, 1983a: 3). For our purposes, land under per-
manent crops has been included as arable land. 
Table 3. Land Use Patterns in the Horn of Africa. 
Ethiopia Kenya Somalia Sudan Tanzania Uganda 
1. Arable land, including 
Permanent Crops (1000 ha.) 
1960-65 12,044 1,723 969 6,180 3,349 4,426 
1981 13,960 2,316 1,116 12,448* 5,190 5,760 
2. Arable Land Per Capita 
1981 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.4 
3 . Percentage of Arable 
Land in Cereal Crops 
1960-65 56 90 31 32 39 23 
1982 34 70 50 40 40 13 
4. Percentage of Arable and 
Land in Roots, Tubers and 
Pulses: 19 81 3 30 3 1 29 17 
5. Percentage of Arable 
Land in Permanent Crops 
1960-65 4 16 1 1 22 22 
1982 5 21 1_ 1 20 28 
6. Percentage of Arable Land 
in Major Export Crops** 
1960-6 5 5 13 1 6 12 10 
1982 6 18 3 11 15 8 
7. Cereal Crop Yields (kg/ha) 
1960-65 728 1,038 686 815 742 907 
1976-78 909 1,539 510 682 781 1,147 
1980-82 1,201 1,677 644 692 679 1,519 
Annual Rate of Growth (%) 
1960/65 to 1980/82 2.7 2.6 -0.3 -0.9 -0.5 2.8 
8. Real Productivity per 
Hectare of Arable Land 
HJ ^ $") Mi it 
K 1960 43 359 . 177 657 86 75 
19 81 73 551 216 270 94 12 
Annual Rate of Growth (%) 2.6 2.1 1.0 -4.1 0.4 -8.4 
* This large shift likely was caused by the exclusion of shifting cultivation 
fallow in 1960-65. 
** The export crops considered were cocoa, coffee, cotton, groundnuts, sisal, 
sugar and tea . 
s'ss'ss'j xhe productivity values are not comparable among the six countries as 
different base years were used to translate them to constant U.S. dollars. 
Sources: Relevant tables in Food and Agriculture Organization, 1975, 1979 and 
1983a. Value of agriuulture output, for item 8, was taken from World 
Bank, 1983, Vol. 1: Economic Data Sheet 1. 
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In Table 3, we note first the region is not particularly well 
endowed with arable land. The most densely populated is Kenya, with 0.1 
hectares of arable land per person. Sudan has the best ratio of arable 
land per capita, 0.7 hectares. During the two decade period, there has been 
some expansion of arable land in each of the six countries. 
Cereal crops play a fairly prominent role in the Horn of Africa, 
with the exception of Uganda. In three countries — Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Uganda — the proportion of arable land used for cereal crops has declined. 
In Kenya, a partial explanation would be the extension of farming to marginal 
land, reducing the proportion of land used to grow more than one crop a year. 
Roots, tubers and pulses are important food crops in Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda. In all six countries, extensive areas are used for grazing purposes, 
with animals providing a primary source of food in the sparsely populated 
pastoral areas. Such pastures are not included in any of the categories 
in Table 3. 
The portion of arable land used for permanent crops is shown 
because such crops reduce flexibility in land use. Permanent crops are 
important only in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. In both Kenya and Uganda 
a larger proportion of a growing land area has been covered with permanent 
crops, 
In item 6 in Table 3, several factors need to be considered. 
First, there is some overlap between export crops and permanent crops. 
Second, not all of the output from these crops is exported. On the other 
hand, not all agricultural exports are included. In 1981, the ratio of 
export revenues from these crops to total value of merchandise exports was: 
Ethiopia, 64%; Kenya 43%; Sudan, 64%; Tanzania, 57%; and Uganda 77% (Food 
and Agricultural Organisation, 1983b and World Bank, 1983, Vol. 1: Economic 
Data Sheet 2). Almost all of Somalia's exports are live animals and 
animal products, so these crops are not relevant there. 
We note in Table 3 that a growing proportion of land area has 
been devoted to export crops in all countries except Uganda. In three 
of the six countries, such export crops now account for more than ten per 
cent of the arable land. In most cases, it likely is not the marginal 
land which is devoted to such export crops. 
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The effect of moving some of.the food production to marginal 
lands likely is one of the reasons for the negative rates of growth in 
yields per hectare for cereal grains in Somalia, Sudan and Tanzania. 
The other three countries have commendable yield increases ; but only in 
Ethiopia is the growth in yields greater than the rate of population 
growth. 
The attempt to measure productivity per hectare should be seen 
as a rough approxination only. Also, as indicated in the footnote to 
Table 3, the values are not comparable among the six countries. Again, 
Ethiopia and Kenya have commendable growth rates. In Sudan and Uganda, 
the growth rates are negative, no doubt reflecting the disruptive effects 
of civil unrest there. Both Somalia and Tanzania have remained relatively 
stagnant. There, increased agricultural supplies have come as much from 
expanding land area under cultivation as from increased productivity per 
unit of land. With growing proportions of land used for export crops, 
relatively stagnant yields per hectare overall does not point to an 
improved food situation.. 
To maximise yields per hectare the available evidence from the 
experience of other countries points to a small-holder approach to agri-
cultural development (Gerrard, 1983: 16; Mellor and Johnston, 1984: 557-
558). With abundant labour and relatively low rural wages, the necess ary 
conditions exist in the Horn of Africa for such a development strategy. 
To facilitate such a strategy there is a need for a land tenure system 
which curbs the concentration of land ownership and for an agricultural 
support system designed to facilitate the advance of small farmers. 
7. Growth in Rural Labour Force and Observed Changes in Labour Productivity 
In section 5 we noted that an increase in the rate of population 
growth, caused primarily by a decline in infant mortality, will lead 
eventually to an increase in the rate of growth of the labour force. This 
result is becoming evident in the Horn of Africa, as is shown in the World 
Bank labour projections from 1980 to 2000 (item 1 in Table 4). 
Table 4 highlights four aspects of the labour force in the six 
countries: 1) laboui- lui'ce growth for the remainder of this century will 
be equal to or greater than three per cent annually (with the exception 
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of Somalia); 2) the economies are still predominantly rural,*'4 so much of 
this rapid growth in the labour force has to be absorbed in some way in 
the rural areas; 3) the labour forces in the rural areas in the six 
countries have been growing between 1.3 and 2.5 per cent annually from 1960 
to 1980; and 4) the economies have a distinctly dual character with labour 
productivity in non-agricultural activity exceeding labour productivity 
in agriculture by a multiple of at least five. 
Historically, development has tended to follow a path where non-
agricultural activity draws sufficient numbers into productive activity 
so that the agricultural labour force declines in absolute size. On 
average, in the nineteen "industrial market economies", the percentage of 
the labour force employed in agriculture declined from 18 per cent in 1960 
to 6 per cent in 1980 (World Bank, 19 84: Table 21). Similarly, in the 8 
"East European nonmarket economies" the decline was from 42 per cent in 
1960 to 18 per cent in 1980. 
For the present, pursuing the approach to development of either 
the West or the East is not an option in the Horn of Africa. The rate of 
growth of the labour force is too high. Since a significant portion of this 
growth has to be employed in rural areas, agricultural practices have to 
remain labour intensive and more of the marginal land will be drawn into 
production. Both factors militate against significant increases in agri-
cultural labour productivity. 
Despite such obstacles, credit must be given to Ethiopia and 
Kenya. Both managed to achieve commendable increases in agricultural 
production while absorbing large numbers of new entrants to the rural labour 
force. Whether they can continue to do so remains to be seen. 
Looking to the future, non-agricultural activity will have to 
play a larger role in absorbing this growth in the labour force. All six 
countries are simply too poor to absorb significant numbers, with each 
labourer endowed with the amount of capital which now serves to generate 
the relatively high productivity of the labour force in non-agricultural 
activity. 
Somalia appears as a real anomaly here. The degree of urbanisation has 
increased from 17 per cent of the population in 1960 to 32 per cent in 1980. 
Yet, 82 per cent of the labour force is still employed in agriculture in 
1980. It would appear that a number of farm-based people in Somalia are 
resident in villages large enough for them to be considered urban centres. 
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Table 4. Labour Force Growth and Labour Productivity in the Horn of Africa 
Ethiopia Kenya Somalia Sudan Tanzania Uganda Low Income Middle Income 
. u _ .. . U-1' - - ' Countries+ Countries 
1. Annual Rate of 
Labour Force 
Growth (%) 
1960-70 2.0 2.7 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.6 1. 8 2.1 
1970-82 1.7 3.3 2 .9 2.8 2.6 2.1 2. 3 2.4 
Projected 1980-2000 ' 3.0 4.2 2.0 3.0 3.4 3.5 3. 0 2.6 
Rural Labour Force 
Growth: 1960-1980 1.3 2.5 2.2 1.5 2.0 1.9 
Percentage of Labour 
Force in Agriculture 
1960 88 86 88 86 89 89 82 62 
1980 80 78 82 78 83 83 73 46 
Percentage of Popul-
ation in Urban 
Centres: 1960 6 7 17 10 5 5 12 33 
1980 15 15 32 23 13 9 20 46 
Labour Productivity 
in Agriculture (Con-
stant U.S. $)* 
1960 73 202 192 1,267. 88 119 
1980 97 316 219 798 84 104 
Annual Rate of 
Growth (%):. -
1960-1980 1.4 2.3 0.4 -2.3 -0.2 -0.7 
Labour Productivity 
in Non-Agricultural 
Activity (Constant 
U.S. $)* 
1960 337 2,262 1,008 8,125 634 1,929 
1980 541 2,743 1,684 4,190 837 535 
Annual Rate of 
Growth (%): 
1960-1980 2.4 1.0 2.6 -3.3 1.4 -6.2 
Ratio of Non-Agri-
cultural to Agri-
cultural Labour 
Productivity 
1960 4.6 11.2 : 5 . 3 6.4 7.2 16.2 
1980 5.6 8.7 7. 7 5.3 10.0 5.1 
+ Low income countries excluding China and India. 
The productivity values are not comparable among the six countries as different 
base years were used to translate them to constant U.S. dollars. 
Sources: Items 1,2 and 3 - World Bank, 1984: Table 21 and 22 (except the growth in 
rural labour forte which was calculated from World Bank, 1983, Vol. 2: Social Data 
Sheet 1). Labour productivity was calculated from World Bank, 1983 Vol. 1: Economic 
Data Sheet 1; and Vol. 2: Social Data Sheet 1. 
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A starting point for an increased integration of agricultural 
and non-agricultural activity is to actively pursue a unimodal approach 
to agricultural development (Mellor and Johnston, 1984: 557). To achieve 
a unimodal approach, the countries of the Horn of Africa need to look to 
the models of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, where the distribution of 
farm sizes are concentrated around the mean, and avoid the errors of 
Mexico and Colombia, where large numbers of small farmers struggle to co-
exist with a small number of large farms (Gerrard, 1983: 16). 
Without necessarily intending to do so, Uganda has made some 
significant strides in reducing the gap between agricultural and non-
agricultural labour productivity. This is a contributing factor to Uganda* 
current ability to feed itself. It has eliminated much of the elite, 
with its distinct preference for imported cereals. (Of course, abundant 
supplies of arable land and more predictable rainfall levels are important 
elements as well.) Tanzania, in contrast, has attempted to plan develop-
ment in such a way as to avoid dualism. A primary result has been 
stagnant productivity levels in agriculture, and hence growing dualism. 
The combination of the two effects generates a significant need for 
imported cereals and for food aid. 
) 
Where Sudan has an overall pattern somewhat similar to Uganda, 
the situation is quite different. Deteriorating productivity occurred 
during the 1960's in Sudan while in Uganda it occurred during the 1970*s. 
For the past decade Sudan has made good productivity g^ins, although not 
nearly enough to offset the losses in the 1960's. With the improved 
productivity, some increase in dualism is occurring as well. 
Increases in productive employment should represent a high 
priority in the Horn of Africa. Without improved employment opp orturji-
ties, including increased productivity for agricultural labour, food 
prospects for certain groups in society — landless rural workers, the 
urban poor, the handicapped, pastoralists and some small farmers -- will 
remain bleak. They lack the opportunity to grow adequate supplies of 
their own food, especially during periods of drought. Whenever they lack 
the ability to command adeqiuate food supplies in the market, they suffer, 
malnutrition. Periodically, during periods of drought, they will be 
caught up in famines. 
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8. Levels of Investment 
Capital is no longer seen as the primary determinant of 
development. Nonetheless, it does play an important role in enhancing 
the productivity of land and labour. In most cases, technological 
changes require some capital for successful implementation. In Table 5 
we outline the levels and rates of growth of gross domestic investment 
plus provide an indicator of government priorities. 
With reference to the proportion of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) devoted to investment, the six countries are similar to the 
average for low income countries. Because of their poverty the propor-
tion of GDP devoted to investment in low income countries is signifi-
cantly less than in middle income countries (item 1, Table 5). This, 
in turn, is a partial explanation of why there is a difference in the 
material standard of living between low income and middle income countries. 
For the six countries, the one exception is Kenya, with an investment 
pattern similar to middle income countries . The extent of foreign invest-
ment likely is a partial explanation for Kenya's investment performance.* 
When we consider the rates of growth in investment (item 2, 
Table 5), most of the six countries performed above average for low income 
countries during the 1960's. With the increase in oil prices and the 
subsequent world recession, the heavy dependence on oil imports, and on 
primary commodity exports to pay for imports, served to depress the rates 
of growth of investment significantly in the 1970's. The exception is 
Sudan, likely reflecting a recovery from the serious adverse effects of 
civil unrest during the 1960's. 
In some of these countries, actions by government need not 
necessarily reflect the priorities of the majority of the people. None-
theless, governments are a major economic force in these economies. 
The proportion of public expenditure devoted to various items is an 
indicator of government priorities. 
As show.n in item 3 in Table 5, these countries are quite 
typical for low income countries in the proportion of GNP devoted to 
Net direct foreign investment in Kenya increased from $13.8 million U.S. 
dollars in 1970 to 60.6 million U.S. dollars in 1981 (World Bank, 1983, 
Vol. 1: Table 7). 
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Table 5. Investment Patterns and Government Spending Priorities in the 
Horn of Africa 
Ethiopia Kenya Somalia Sudan Tanzania Uganda Low Income Middle Income 
Countries* Countries 
1. Percentage of GDP 
Spent on Gross 
Domestic Invest-
ment 
1960 12 20 10 9 14 11 13 20 
19 82 11 22 ~ 16 20 8 13 24 
2. Annual Rate of 
Growth of Gross 
Domestic Invest-
ment (%) 
1960-70 5.7 10.3 4.3 3.2 9.8 7.5 4.6 7.6 
1970-82 0.7 2.1 — 9 .0 3.4 -8.0 3.2 6.6 
3. Percentage of GNP 
Spent on: 
-Defense: 1972 2.0 1.3 3.1 4.6 2.3 5.0 2.4 3.0 
1981 10.9" 3.0 6 .9* 2.5 3.7 1.1 2.7 2.4 
-Public Expenditure 
on Health and 
Education: 1972 2.8 6.3 1.7 2.8 4.8 5.0 4.7 3.7 
1981 3.7* 8.1 2.7* 2.3 5.9 0.5 2.8 4.8 
-Public Expenditure 
on Agriculture 
1972 0.4 1.3 1.9 4.4 3.0 
1981 1 .7(78) 3.1 1.5(78) 1.8(80) 1.1(79) — 
4. Fertilizer Consumption 
(100 grams per hectare 
of arable land) 
1970 4 224 31 31 30 13 85 206 
1981 33 334 12 60 56 1 187 425 
+ Low income countries excluding China and India. 
* These values were taken from Sivard (1983), 
Sources: Item 1 - World Bank, 1984: Table 5. Item 2 - World Bank, 1984: Table 4. 
Item 3 - World Bank, 1984: Table 26, except "Public Expenditure on Agriculture", 
which was estimated from World Bank, 1983, Vol. 1: Economic Data Sheet 2. Item -
4 - World Bank, 19 84: Table 6. 
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the military. The exceptions are Ethiopia and Sudan in 1981, reflecting 
their joint hostilities, and Uganda during Amin's administration. Three 
of the countries spent more on health and education than on defence, three 
spent less. Reliable data on economic expenditures on agriculture are 
difficult to obtain, but the percentages given in Table 5 suggest all the 
countries consider the military as important or more important than 
investing in agriculture. Efforts to stay in power take precedence over 
expanding food production. Such priorities may backfire, as occurred in 
Ethiopia in the first half of the 1970's. 
The final indicator of productivity shown in Table 5 is the 
use of fertilizer in the six countries . Only Kenya shows fertilizer use 
in excess of the average for low income countries. Clearly, commercial 
fertilizer does not play an important role in the production of food in 
the Horn of Africa. 
9. The Role of Agricultural Exports in the Horn of Africa 
In section 6 we noted all six countries were expanding the 
proportion of arable land used for export crops. Given their food short-
ages, this raises the question why is more land being used to produce 
export crops. In Table 6, data relevant to answering this question are 
presented. 
As indicated in Table 6, the Horn of Africa depends heavily 
on the export of food and beverages as a source of foreign exchange. If 
non-food agricultural exports are added to food and beverage exports, 
the ratio of agricultural exports, as a per cent of total merchandise 
exports, exceeds 90 per cent for Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, 80 per cent 
for Ethiopia, and 70 per cent for Tanzania. Only Kenya has been able 
to diversify exports sufficiently to reduce the role of agricultural 
exports to just over one half. 
There are a minimum of four reasons why agricultural exports 
play such an important role: 1) the countries have little else to offer 
that commands a significant price on the international market; 2) import 
needs are growing; 3) the terms of trade (export prices divided by import 
prices) have not been particularly favourable to the Horn of Africa; and 
4) international debts have to be serviced. 
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Table 6. Agricultural Exports, Energy Imports, Terms of Trade and Debt 
Service Ratios in the Horn of Africa 
Ethiopia Kenya Somalia Sudan Tanzania Uganda Low Income Middle Income 
Countries+ Countries 
1. Food and Beverage 
Exports as a Per Cent 
of Total Merchandise 
Exports: 196 2 
1970 
1980 
80.3 59.3 82.9 
85.9 63.1 85.5 
74.1 43.8 88.6 
44.3 -- 62.6 
24.6 49,8 68,4 
46.9 58,1 
2. Energy Imports as a 
Per Cent of Total 
Merchandise Imports 
1960 11 18 4 8 5 10 9 
1978 20 30 — 24 — — — 20 
1981 44 63 2 44 50 — 42 27 
3. Terms of Trade 
(1980»100) 
1960 146 131 121 104 99 93 121 101 
1975 98 98 84 126 101 76 109 101 
1979 139 108 116 98 105 103 108 99 
19 82 74 87 111 85 86 74 87 91 
4. Debt Service Ratio 
<%): 1970 11.4 5.4 2.1 10.7 4.9 2.7 5.7 10.1 
1982 9.5 20.3 7.2 7.5 5.1 22,3 9.9 16.9 
5. Value of Net Exports 
of Food and Beverages 
(million U.S. $) 
1970 92 158 13 13 104 167 
19 80 259 36 7 57 31 189 — 
6. Value of Net Exports 
of Agricultural Com-
modities (mill. U.S.$) 
1970 101 185 13 219 175 222 
1980 287 416 46 368 276 
+ . Low income countries excluding China and India. 
Sources: Item 1 - World Bank, 1983, Vol. 1: Table 5. Item 2 - World Bank, 1984: 
Table 8 and World Bank, 1981: Table 7. Item 3 - World Bank, 1984: Table 9 and 
World Bank, 1981: Table 8. Item 4 - World Bank, 1984: Table 16. Items 5 and 6 -
calculated from World Bank, 1983, Vol. 1: Economic Data Sheet 2 and Table 5 and 6. 
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To illustrate the growing import needs, energy imports are 
shown in Table 6. The combination of a growing transportation system, 
based on fossil fuels for energy, and rapidly increasing oil prices has 
had its effect on all countries except Somalia.* 
As Table 6 illustrates, terms of trade fluctuated considerably. 
The overall situation for low income countries is outlined by the World 
Bank (1981: Figure 3.3). During the 1970's these countries increased the 
quantity of their primary commodity exports by more than 80 per cent. 
But, during the same period, prices for these exports dropped by more than 
60 per cent. As a result, the "export purchasing power" of these 
countries increased by less than 20 per cent during the decade. In this 
decade, percentage changes in the terms of trade for low income African 
countries were: -5.5 in 1981, -1.9 in 1982, and 3.0 in 1983 (World Bank, 
1984: 24). In the Horn of Africa, all six countries were affected 
adversely by the 1980 to 1982 world recession. 
The need to service debt (pay interest and principal due on 
international loans) accounts for less than ten per cent of the value 
of exports in all countries except Kenya and Uganda. In part this 
reflects the unwillingness of international lenders to invest in low 
income producers of agricultural exports. Nonetheless, to assure 
additional credit, existing debt must be serviced. Agricultural exports 
to the developed countries are the means of servicing such debt. 
In conclusion then, we return to the subject with which we 
started: the international exchange of 'food'. In item 5 of Table 6 
the value of food and beverage exports, less the value of food and 
beverage imports, are given. Summing across the six countries, the Horn 
of Africa made a net contribution of approximately one billion dollars 
worth of food and beverages to the rest of the world. When we consider 
all agricultural exports, the Horn of Africa contributed, net, approxi-
mately 1.5 billion dollars worth of agricultural commodities. The food 
aid received and the food aid projected for 1984/85, as reported in 
Table 1, needs to be see in the light of this net outflow of agricultural 
commodities from the Horn of Africa. 
A 
Kenya re-exports part of the oil in the form of refined petroleum 
products, so the numbers given overstate Kenya's energy import needs. 
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Such a net export of food, in the face of food shortages, 
raises the question: why does it occur. The irrmediate answer seems 
simple: it pays for all participants in this trade of agricultural output. 
It must pay for the profit-seeking plantations and corporate agribusinesses. 
Informal conversations indicate the FAO has data which demonstrate that 
small-scale indigenous producers in low income countries have achieved a 
level of income, as a result of export crop production, above what they 
could have earned producing food for the local market. Agricultural 
exports also serve as a primary source of tax revenue for many governments 
and as a primary source of foreign exchange, to finance capital imports 
and to finance the import tastes of the elite. 
The export of semi-exotic foods and industrial crops may also 
command a larger quantity of cereals on the international market than 
would be grown on the land used for export crops. For low income count-
ries, the difference in cereals that could be purchased via trade and the 
cereals that would be grown on land now devoted to export crops has been 
estimated to range from a multiple of 1.5 to 20 in 1963 to a multiple of 
1.5 to 10 in 1975 (Hillman, 1981: Table 1). 
Hence, it can be shown to pay for the country as a whole, for 
the participants in the export trade, and for the ruling elite. The 
problem is one of the distribution of the gains from trade. The pursuit 
of personal advantage by those in control of the means of production 
has increased the vulnerability of the people in the lcwer income groups 
in these countries. They suffer because they have limited or no access 
to the means of producing their own food — land, farm inputs, credit, 
etc. — and they find it difficult to obtain regular, remunerative employ-
ment. They are the victims of the extensive exportation of semi-exotic 
food and industrial crops. Their malnutrition is the opportunity cost 
of the taste preferences of the elites for imported goods and the high 
priority given by the governments to the military. 
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